THE
Dan Smoot Report

Vol. 9, No. 20 (Broadcast 405) May 20, 1963 Dallas, Texas



DAN SMOOT

DISARMAMENT—PART III

As early as 1917, international communists began to use world-wide disarmament propaganda as a means of attack against non-communist nations, particularly the United States. To communists, *world-wide disarmament* does not mean elimination from the world of all weapons of war. It means taking all weapons away from non-communists so that they can offer no resistance to communism.

Lenin said, and Khrushchev has repeated, that communists are contemptuous of pacifism, but can effectively use pacifists in non-communist nations.

Pacifists believe that war is horrible; and every decent and sane person on earth agrees with them. Pacifists, however, are not willing to accept reality. *Reality* is that wars are inevitable until human beings are better than they have ever been since Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden of Eden.

Human beings cannot be improved through legislation or disarmament pacts. They certainly cannot be improved by having their weapons taken away from them.

Suppose non-communist nations could make an agreement with communist dictators which resulted in the actual world-wide elimination of all modern weapons of war. What would then prevent the hordes of Asia and Africa from overrunning the civilized world with butcher knives?

To avoid such a catastrophe, why not disarm all nations, but at the same time arm an international authority to keep the peace? This would be worse than total disarmament *without* an armed authority to enforce order. Any agency with enough authority to police the world, and with a monopoly of weapons, will enslave and oppress the world. That fact also derives from the nature of man. Civilized people stripped of weapons

THE DAN SMOOT REPORT, a magazine published every week by The Dan Smoot Report, Inc., mailing address P. O. Box 9538, Lakewood Station, Dallas 14, Texas, Telephone TAylor 1-2303 (Office Address 6441 Gaston Avenue). Subscription rates: $10.00 a year, $6.00 for 6 months, $18.00 for two years. For first class mail $12.50 a year; by airmail (including APO and FPO) $14.50 a year. Reprints of specific issues: 1 copy for 25¢; 6 for $1.00; 50 for $5.50; 100 for $10.00—each price for bulk mailing to one person. Add 2% sales tax on all orders originating in Texas for Texas delivery.

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would, at least, have a *better* chance to defend themselves against lawless and ravaging hordes than to defend themselves against an international authority armed with modern weapons, and in control of the world.

Men will become "good" enough to refrain from warring on each other only when, and if, all men accept for themselves the saving grace that God offers. Meanwhile, it behooves all nations (most especially civilized Western nations whose culture is founded on faith in God) to maintain whatever weaponry is necessary to protect their civilization against all threats, within or without.

Before the councils of the world, there are, at present, two basic proposals for so-called world-wide disarmament: the Soviet government's proposal and the American government's proposal.

The *Soviet government* pretends to want world-wide disarmament without a strong international authority to keep the peace. Even if the communist proposal were honest (which it most certainly is not), it would eventuate in the catastrophe of a defenseless civilized world being overrun by hordes of barbarians.

The *American government* wants total disarmament of all nations, with an international authority armed and empowered to enforce the peace — a plan which would eventuate in a universal, all-powerful dictatorship even more horrible than anarchy.

How we arrived at the point where the nations of the world are seriously considering these two alternatives for disaster is an amazing story — parts of which are sketched in the two previous issues of this *Report*.

A Review

The testing of nuclear explosions — in the air, under ground, under water, and in space — is necessary for research to develop nuclear weapons, particularly defensive weapons: anti-missile missiles, for example. Each nuclear explosion produces a mass of new information which is useless until it has been studied, evaluated, and correlated with other technical information.

Yet, the time and cost of preparing for a nuclear shot make one-shot nuclear testing impractical. The practical way is to arrange a *series* of nuclear explosions, and then to suspend all testing until the whole mass of information produced has been assimilated. The work of assimilation may take years. During that time, it is not sensible to do any major testing.

In the spring of 1958, the Soviets, having concluded a major series of nuclear tests, asked for a moratorium on testing. Peace propagandists raised a clamor in support of the Soviet proposal. On October 31, 1958, Eisenhower halted all plans for American nuclear testing, accepting Khrushchev's unsupported promise that he would do likewise.

Kennedy continued the ban on American testing, though it was universally known that the Soviets had never kept their word. The men whom Kennedy placed in charge of defense and disarmament policies were on record as wanting American disarmament, with or without Soviet disarmament; they devised a defense program admittedly intended to please the Soviets; they rammed through Congress an Act creating a Disarmament Agency[1] with a Director empowered to do anything (including violations of federal law) which he might claim to be in the interest of peace and disarmament; and they submitted to the UN a proposed treaty which would disarm the United States and surrender her nuclear weapons.

By the end of 1961, military men were expressing grave fear that the Kennedy defense and disarmament programs would leave the United States virtually helpless against the Soviets.[2]

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1962

On March 2, 1962, President Kennedy said the Soviets, in their nuclear tests, were pressing hard toward the goal of developing the most desperately needed weapon of our time — a means of destroying attacking enemy rockets before they explode on target. The President said the Soviet tests of 1961 "reflected . . . the trial of novel designs and techniques, and some substantial gains in weaponry." Mentioning the powerful "nuclear attack and defense capability" which the Soviets are developing, the President warned that further Soviet tests would put the free world in grave danger. He said that the United States "cannot make similar strides without testing in the atmosphere as well as underground," and that "in many areas of nuclear weapons research we have reached the point where our progress is stifled without experiments in every environment."[3]

Concerning the possibility of negotiating some effective ban on Soviet testing, the President said:

"The basic lesson of some 3 years and 353 negotiating sessions at Geneva is this — that the Soviets will not agree to an effective ban . . . as long . . . as . . . a new uninspected moratorium or a new agreement without controls, would enable them once again to prevent the West from testing while they prepare in secret."[3]

On March 11, 1962, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, said the United States has "no reasonable prospect" of developing a successful defense against missiles. At the same time, American officialdom generally was reflecting the expressed conviction of the President that the Soviets may be on the point of developing such a defensive weapon.

In view of all this, it was reasonable to assume that the President would order immediate preparations for massive American testing of nuclear weapons. He did not. He ordered a new series of atmospheric tests to be held in the Pacific beginning in late April, 1962 — but promised that the tests would not be conducted if the Soviets would sign a nuclear test ban by mid April.[4]

On March 14, 1962, when the Eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee began another series of disarmament conferences at Geneva, the United States and Great Britain proposed the outlawing of underground nuclear tests, suggesting an international inspection system to detect and investigate suspicious earth tremors — that is, earth tremors which seismic instruments could not positively identify as earthquakes. The Soviets held out for an unpoliced moratorium on underground tests, pending the development of a control system for general and complete disarmament.[4]

On April 9, 1962, President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan personally appealed to Khrushchev to reconsider the Soviet position, pointing out that scientific instrumentation is not fully capable of distinguishing earthquakes from underground explosions.[5]

On April 12, 1962, Khrushchev replied by saying Kennedy and MacMillan wanted inspection as a means of "choosing the moment to attack the Soviet Union."[5]

On April 12, 1962, various members of the 18-nation Committee appealed to the Soviet Union and the United States to enter another unpoliced moratorium on testing for the duration of the Conference. The Soviet Union agreed to this proposal.[4]

On April 16, 1962, eight small-nation members of the Eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee suggested a compromise solution, which was, in effect, that existing *national* control and detection systems be used instead of the *international* inspection system demanded by the United States. An impartial International Commission would process data produced by the various national detection systems. If the International Commission noticed data which might indicate an illegal nuclear test somewhere, it would notify the nation on whose territory that event occurred. The sus-

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pected nation would then co-operate with the International Commission in determining the precise nature of the explosion in question.[5]

The United States and the United Kingdom accepted this eight-nation proposal as a basis for negotiation. The Soviets also accepted it, saying it was practically identical with their own proposal.[4]

On April 18, 1962, United States Ambassador Arthur H. Dean presented to the Eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." This plan, developed by the U. S. Disarmament Agency, has been officially characterized as "the most comprehensive blueprint for peace through multilateral international disarmament that the United States or any other country has ever undertaken."[4] William C. Foster, Director of the Disarmament Agency, sums up his 1962 general disarmament proposals in these words:

"The United States proposes to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament in three stages. In each stage all major armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, would be reduced by one-third. . . .

"Stage I of the U. S. plan contains essential measures to meet the nuclear threat, especially by a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons purposes. Further measures to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons remaining in national arsenals would be carried out in stages II and III of the U. S. Program after the completion of international expert studies."[4]

The American disarmament proposal which Foster thus describes, and which was formally presented at Geneva on April 18, 1962, is basically the same as the treaty which Adlai Stevenson submitted to the United Nations in September, 1961 — proposing to strip the United States of nuclear, and other modern weapons, by turning them over to the United Nations. The 1962 proposal, however, went into detail about *how* the reduction in national armaments would be carried out in a three-stage plan. Nations would reduce their armaments by one-third each year for three years. Combat aircraft and ships and missiles of all kinds, anti-missile missile systems, tanks, armored cars, and so on — all would be placed in a depot under supervision of an International Disarmament Organization. The IDO would have power to destroy them, order them converted for "peaceful" purposes, or order them turned over to a United Nations military force to strengthen the UN peace-keeping machinery. The Soviets rejected the American proposal.

No agreement having been reached at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, President Kennedy ordered a resumption of American testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The series began on April 26, 1962. But the testing was timid and halting, hobbled by politics and propaganda. Kennedy permitted only a few tests in the atmosphere before again suspending them.

The first session of the Eighteen-nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva ended, with no accomplishments, on June 14, 1962.[5]

When the second session opened on July 16, 1962, American representatives startled the world by reversing the American stand on the question of inspection and control. Consistently, American officials had insisted that disarmament would not work unless there was an *international* inspection and control system. Khrushchev had consistently insisted that existing *national* inspection and control systems would be adequate — since these systems could report to an international commission on any suspicious activity which they detected. In April, 1962, President Kennedy had rejected Khrushchev's proposal for an unpoliced moratorium on underground nuclear testing for the specific reason that there is no positive means of telling whether an earth tremor is caused by earthquake or by underground explosion.[4,5]

On August 1, 1962, President Kennedy announced that, whereas in April he had not

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believed that there was adequate seismic instrumentation for identifying earth tremors, he now believed there was such equipment and that he was, therefore, willing to abandon the previous American demand for an international inspection and control system. The President said he is now willing to accept the proposal (perennially made by Khrushchev) for a *national* system under international supervision.[4,5]

The President laid down one proviso: the Soviets must accept the American principle of on-site inspections of unidentified seismic events. This means that if detection equipment records and locates an earth tremor which cannot be identified as an earthquake, international inspectors should be permitted to go to the locale of that tremor (within the Soviet Union or elsewhere) and make an on-the-spot (on-site) inspection.

As usual, the Soviets rejected the on-site inspection proposal.

The United States tried again. On August 27, 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom introduced at the Geneva Conference two *new* treaties which the U.S. Disarmament Agency had drawn up. One provided for a *total* ban on all kinds of nuclear testing, the ban to be policed by a *nationally* manned detection system under international supervision. The other Disarmament Agency proposal of August 27, provided for a *limited* ban on nuclear testing — without any international verification machinery.[4,5]

The "Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests In All Environments," which the United States and the United Kingdom proposed on August 27, 1962, would place an International Scientific Commission in charge of all arrangements and agreements. This Commission would be composed of representatives of 15 nations.

The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain would each be a permanent member. Of the remaining 12 members, the Soviet Union would nominate 3; the United States would nominate 1; Great Britain would nominate 1; and all three powers together would nominate 7.[4]

The Soviet Union rejected both of the American August 27 proposals and demanded an uninspected moratorium on nuclear testing to begin January 1, 1963. The Soviets were near completion of their 1961-1962 tests and wanted to call time-out in 1963 for the necessary period of study and evaluation. President Kennedy replied that the United States was willing to ban all nuclear tests beginning January 1, 1963, if an effective agreement could be reached by then.

The 10th Pugwash Conference, held at London in September, 1962, proposed that detection of nuclear explosions be achieved by unmanned nuclear detection stations (little black boxes). *Pugwash Conference* refers to meetings of Soviet and Western scientists which have been held at intervals since July, 1957 — when the first such conference was held in Pugwash, Nova Scotia,[4] at the home of Cyrus Eaton, an American industrialist whose sympathy with the Soviet Union is notorious.

No unmanned detection stations, of the kind suggested by the pro-Soviets at the Pugwash Conference, have yet been developed. If developed, they would be small, portable, sealed boxes, containing seismic equipment. A specified number of them would be placed in specified locations throughout the world. If other detection equipment recorded an unidentifiable earth tremor located, say, on Soviet soil, the United States (or any other nation) could request that international inspectors examine the seismic boxes located in the Soviet Union to see what they had recorded. The Soviets would then fly the boxes to some designated place and let international inspectors examine them. That is the "little black boxes" scheme, devised by Cyrus Eaton's pro-Soviet Pugwash Conference at London in September, 1962.

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On December 10, 1962, the Soviets formally adopted the Pugwash proposal as their own, suggesting a nuclear test ban to be monitored by the little boxes. The Soviets said they were willing to have *two or three* such boxes placed in Soviet territory. They even promised to permit international inspectors to enter the Soviet Union periodically to collect readings from the little boxes—provided the inspectors were under tight Soviet escort and security screening while on Soviet territory.

United States officialdom welcomed this Soviet proposal as a heartening sign and as a hopeful forerunner of things to come, although admitting that the Soviet proposal did not provide the foolproof inspection and control which the United States wanted.

On December 12, 1962, the fourth "treaty" or set of arms-control proposals devised by the U.S. Disarmament Agency, was submitted to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Made "in the wake of the Cuban crisis," this December 12 proposal included six measures designed to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or the failure of communication. Those six measures:

"First, the exchange of military missions among nations. We currently exchange military attaches with the Soviet Union: this proposal would be a broadening of this precedent.

"Second, advance notification to all countries of military maneuvers.

"Third, the improvement of communications between major governments. This would include the so-called 'hot line' or 'purple telephone' between President Kennedy and Chairman Khruschev but would also take in lower echelon communications as well.

"Fourth, observation posts established at major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and river crossings.

"Fifth, an international committee to study other methods to reduce the risk of war through miscalculation.

"Sixth, additional observation procedures — not specified."[6]

On December 19, 1962, Khrushchev wrote President Kennedy that the Soviet Union would accept two to three on-site inspections per year on Soviet territory, and would permit three unmanned seismic stations in the Soviet Union.[6]

On December 28, 1962, Kennedy wrote Khrushchev saying he was encouraged that the Soviet Union could "accept the principle of on-site inspections," but said that three unmanned seismic stations were not enough and that the locations suggested by Khrushchev might not do.[6]

1963

On January 7, 1963, Khrushchev wrote Kennedy again, making it clear that his acceptance of the principle of on-site inspections means that any inspectors entering the Soviet Union will enter only on the invitation of the Soviet government; that they will be under careful guard and escort by the Soviets while there; and that the Soviets reserve the right to keep the inspectors from seeing anything which the Soviets may not want them to see.[3]

This seemed to satisfy President Kennedy. On January 20, 1963, he again stopped all American nuclear testing (even underground) — at a time when the Soviets had finished all the testing they wanted and needed leisure to digest the information. On January 31, 1963, the Soviets (having reached their objective of stopping American nuclear testing) abruptly ended the disarmament conference. The next day, February 1, 1963, President Kennedy ordered preparations for new nuclear tests in Nevada.

On March 11, 1963, William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, testified before the Joint Atomic Energy Commission of Congress, saying he is confident that the Soviets will not cheat on a nuclear test ban, once they accept a treaty.

As to further concessions which the United States may make in the interest of negotiating

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a test ban treaty, Mr. Foster said we now demand *seven* annual inspections of specified installations on Soviet soil, and that we will not reduce that number "until there is some movement away from the Soviet position."[7]

When the nuclear test ban negotiations first began in 1958, the United States was demanding an elaborate international inspection and control system, implemented by *twenty* annual, unconditional, on-site inspections. By March, 1963, U. S. officials had abandoned the international inspection and control system, and were willing to accept only seven on-site inspections.

On April 24, 1963, Western leaders made another appeal to Khrushchev, this time indicating willingness to make further concessions in the matter of on-site inspections. They asked Khrushchev to quit thinking about the *number* of annual on-site inspections, and to please concentrate on modifying his requirements about *how* the inspections will be conducted.[8]

Complicated programs of nuclear testing cannot be turned on and off like water taps. Preparations for a series of nuclear tests in Nevada (which Kennedy ordered on February 1, 1963, after ordering suspension of preparations on January 20) cost taxpayers a lot of money but produced nothing.

On May 13, 1963, the Atomic Energy Commission announced cancellation of the planned series of tests in Nevada — giving no reason and no date for resumption of the plans.[9]

WHAT TO DO

The danger we face — of having the armaments and the sovereignty of our nation

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surrendered by bureaucrats who man the Disarmament Agency — is grave.

The most immediate need for action is strong public support for HR 3613, a Bill introduced by U. S. Representative James B. Utt (Republican, California), to abolish the Disarmament Agency and repeal the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.

On February 7, 1963, U. S. Representative Omar Burleson (Democrat, Texas) introduced in the House H. Con. Res. 83; and on February 20, 1963, Senator Carl T. Curtis (Republican, Nebraska) introduced the same Resolution in the Senate as S. Con. Res. 21. This Curtis-Burleson Resolution attempts to guarantee congressional supervision of Disarmament Agency proposals and to guarantee that any disarmament agreements that may be negotiated must be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.

In my opinion, the Curtis-Burleson Resolution is not enough. It may be comforting to some to know that committees of Congress will be looking over the shoulders of men negotiating the surrender of the United States and that the Senate must approve the surrender. But it does not comfort me. I think we should stop the negotiating. A major step in that direction would be adoption of Utt's Bill to abolish the Disarmament Agency.

FOOTNOTES

(1) The list below gives the names of all United States Senators and Representatives who took a stand, in roll call votes, *against* the Disarmament Agency Act in 1961. If your Senator or Representative was in Congress at that time and is *not* listed below, he was *in favor* of the Disarmament Agency. The votes are taken from the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* of September 15, p. 1602; September 22, pp. 1640-1; and September 29, pp. 1686-7; all 1961.

SENATE: *Arizona* — Goldwater (R); *Arkansas* — McClellan (D); *Florida* — Smathers (D); *Georgia* — Russell (D), Talmadge (D); *Kansas* — Schoeppel (R); *Louisiana* — Ellender (D); *Mississippi* — Eastland (D), Stennis (D); *Nebraska* — Curtis (R), Hruska (R); *South Carolina* — Thurmond (D); *South Dakota* — Mundt (R); *Texas* — Tower (R); *Virginia* — Byrd (D)

HOUSE: *Arizona* — Rhodes (R); *Arkansas* — Alford (D), Gathings (D), Norrell (D); *California* — Bell (R), Hiestand (R), Lipscomb (R), McDonough (R), Rousselot (R), Sheppard (D), Smith (R), Utt (R); *Colorado* — Dominick (R); *Florida* — Haley (D); *Georgia* — James C. Davis (D); *Illinois* — Anderson (R), Findley (R), Hoffman (R); *Indiana* — Bruce (R), Roudebush (R), Wilson (R); *Iowa* — Hoeven (R), Gross (R), Jensen (R); *Kansas* — Dole (R), McVey (R); *Louisiana* — Hebert (D); *Michigan* — Bennett (R), Harvey (R), Hoffman (R), Johansen (R), Meader (R); *Mississippi* — Williams (D); Winstead (D); *Missouri* — Hall (R); *Montana* — Battin (R); *Nebraska* — Beerman (R), Cunningham (R); *New Jersey* — Auchincloss (R); *New York* — Derounian (R), Kilburn (R), King (R), Pillion (R), Ray (R), St. George (R), Taber (R); *North Dakota* — Short (R); *Ohio* — Ashbrook (R), Devine (R), Scherer (R); *Pennsylvania* — Gavin (R), Goodling (R), Saylor (R); *South Carolina* — Ashmore (D), Dorn (D), Riley (D), Rivers (D); *Texas* — Alger (R), Burleson (D), Casey (D), Dowdy (D), Rutherford (D), Teague (D); *Virginia* — Abbitt (D), Tuck (D); *Wisconsin* — Laird (R), O'Konski (R), Schadeberg (R), Van Pelt (R)

(2) For a complete discussion of the background of disarmament, including documentation, see this *Report*, "Disarmament — Part I," May 6, 1963; and "Disarmament — Part II," May 13, 1963.

(3) *The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation*, by Stefan T. Possony, *Congressional Record*, pp. 4358-70

(4) *Second Annual Report to Congress, January 1, 1962 — December 31, 1962*, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 14, February, 1963

(5) *International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961 — September 1962*. U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 9, October, 1962

(6) Remarks of U. S. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota), *Congressional Record*, February 11, 1963, pp. 2023 ff.

(7) "Foster Expects No Cheating If Reds Accept Test Ban," *The Washington Evening Star*, March 12, 1963

(8) *The New York Times*, April 25, 1963, pp. 1, 4

(9) AP dispatch from Washington, *The Dallas Morning News*, May 14, 1963, p. 1

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WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Born in Missouri, reared in Texas, Dan Smoot went to SMU in Dallas, getting BA and MA degrees in 1938 and 1940. In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow in English, doing graduate work for a doctorate in American Civilization.

In 1942, he left Harvard and joined the FBI. As an FBI Agent, he worked for three and a half years on communist investigations in the industrial Midwest; two years as an administrative assistant to J. Edgar Hoover on FBI headquarters staff in Washington; and almost four years on general FBI cases in various parts of the nation.

In 1951, Smoot resigned from the FBI and helped start Facts Forum. On Facts Forum radio and television programs, Smoot spoke to a national audience, giving *both sides* of controversial issues.

In July, 1955, he resigned and started his present independent publishing and broadcasting business — a free-enterprise operation financed entirely by profits from sales: sales of *The Dan Smoot Report*, a weekly magazine; and sales of a weekly news-analysis broadcast, to business firms, for use on radio and television as an advertising vehicle. The *Report* and the broadcast give only *one* side in presenting documented truth about important issues — the side that uses the American Constitution as a yardstick. The *Report* is available by subscription; and the broadcasts are available for commercial sponsorship, anywhere in the United States.

If you think Dan Smoot is providing effective tools for Americans fighting socialism and communism, you can help immensely — by helping him get more customers for his *Report* and broadcasts.

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